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PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF
OSHA INSPECTION WARRANTS
In 1978, the Supreme Court held in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.'
that warrantless nonconsensual worksite inspections conducted by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration' violate the fourth
amendment rights of the employer.3  The Barlow's decision spawned
much comment 4 and opened the door for extensive future litigation. 5
436 U.S. 307 (1978).
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is an executive agency,
within the Department of Labor, created by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
a The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall'not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
" See, e.g., Rothstein, OSHA Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 1979 DUKE L.J.
63; Note, Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.: Are Employer's Fourth Amendment Rights Protected?, 16 CAL.
W.L. REv. 161 (1980); Note, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the
Warrant Requirement, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 856 (1979); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: OSHA
Needs a Warrant, 57 N.C. L. REv. 320 (1979); Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Ad-
ministrative Search-The Probable Cause Requirement After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 5 N. Ky. L.
REV. 219 (1978); Comment, Administrative Roulette: Safety Inspection Probable Cause in Light of
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 768 (1979).
' Barlow's left several issues unresolved. First, the court failed to define explicitly the
degree of probable cause necessary for the issuance of an OSHA inspection warrant. See notes
23-27 and accompanying text infra. Second, the ability of the Secretary of Labor to obtain an ex
parte warrant after being refused entry to conduct a worksite inspection is still unclear. In
Barlow's, the Secretary argued that "warrantless inspections are essential to the proper enforce-
ment of OSHA because they afford the opportunity to inspect without prior notice and
hence ... preserve the advantages of surprise." 436 U.S. at 316. The Court, however,
concluded that ex parte warrants issued without prior notice preserve the same element of
surprise. Id. Subsequently, the Secretary amended 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1978) in order to
authorize OSHA officials to obtain ex parte warrants. But in Cerro Metal Products v.
Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 979 (3d Cir. 1980), the Third Circuit held the amendment did not
empower OSHA to seek ex parte warrants. Contra Marshall v. W & W Steel Co., 604 F.2d
1322, 1325-26 (10th Cir. 1979). Following Cerro, the Secretary once again amended 29 C.F.R.
§ 1903.4. The regulation now provides that "compulsory process [to inspect] may be sought in
advance ... if ... circumstances exist which make preinspection process desirable or neces-
sary." 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(b) (1980). Such circumstances may include past refusals by the
employer to permit warrantless entry. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(a) (1980).
A third issue, that Barlow's raised but left unresolved is whether evidence obtained in
violation of the Barlow's warrant requirements can be excluded from OSHA proceedings. The
applicability of the exclusionary rule to administrative as opposed to criminal adjudications is
unclear. The Supreme Court has not dealt with this issue. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing inspectors must
obtain a search warrant in nonemergency situations); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
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One issue, in particular, divides the lower federal courts: the permissi-
ble scope of an OSHA inspection initiated in response to an em-
ployee's complaint. Although some courts limit such inspections to the
specific areas mentioned in the complaint, 6 others permit comprehen-
sive "wall to wall" inspections.7 Both approaches suffer substantial
deficiencies. 8 Courts should recognize that the scope of a warrant
ought to be reasonably related to the violations alleged in the com-
plaint and to other significant surrounding circumstances.
I
OSHA INSPECTIONS AND SEARCH WARRANTS
A. The Occupational Safety and Health Act
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970' to reduce the increasing number of job-related deaths and
accidents. 10 The Act requires employers' to comply with safety and
(1967) (search warrant required in commercial setting as well). In Savina Home Indus. v.
Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979), however, the Tenth Circuit stated in
dictum that the purpose of the exclusionary rule-' 'preserving judicial integrity and deterring
official lawlessness"-required its application to illegal searches conducted by the Department
of Labor as well as the Department of Justice. Id. at 1363. See Note, Applicability of the
Exclusionary Rule to Illegal OSHA Inspections: Savina Home Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor,
64 MINN. L. REv. 789 (1980).
A fourth unresolved issue involves the procedures an employer can use to challenge the
validity of an OSHA warrant. An employer has a choice of four approaches: (1) enjoining the
issuance of the warrant; (2) refusing to allow the inspection and moving to quash the warrant;
(3) permitting the inspection and bringing an action to enjoin further enforcement activity by
the Secretary; (4) contesting the inspection before the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission. There are, however, problems involved in each of these approaches. For a
discussion of these approaches, see Rothstein, supra note 4, at 100-03.
' See, e.g., Marshall v. Trinity Indus., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1851 (W.D. Okla. 1979); Sarasota
Concrete Co., [1979] OSHD (CCH) 23,839 (OSHRC), aff'd [1981] OSHD (CCH) 25,360
(OSHRC); Central Mine Equipment Co., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1185 (E.D. Mo. 1979), vacated on
other grounds, 608 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1979).
' See, e.g., Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313, 1323-24
(7th Cir. 1980); In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335,
1343-44 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979); In re Establishment Inspection of
Marsan Co., 7 OSHO (BNA) 1557 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Dravo Corp. v. Marshall, 5 OSHC
(BNA) 2057 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1373 (3d Cir. 1978).
s See notes 63-67 and accompanying text infra.
9 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976)).
10 Work related accidents kill approximately 14,500 workers and disable more than 2.2
million workers each year. The number of disabling injuries per million worker hours in 1970
was 20% higher than in 1958. This increase prompted enactment of the Act. S. REP. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1-5, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CoDe CONG. & AD. News 5177,
5177-81. The purpose of the Act is "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman
in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human re-
sources . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
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health standards relating to conditions and operations in the work-
place. 12  The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), under authority of the Act, conducts inspections at the
employers' workplaces,' 3 issues citations,' 4 and recommends penal-
ties 5 for violations of the Act and of regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor.' OSHA can undertake such inspections either
in accordance with an OSHA administrative plan,' 7 or in response to
an employee complaint.' 8
1 OSHA covers an estimated 4.1 million business establishments and 57 million em-
ployees. Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches & Seizures: What Happened to Camara and
See?, 50 WASH. L. REv. 341, 366 (1975).
12 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1976).
13 Section 8(a) of the Act established OSHA's right to inspect workplaces:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon
presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is
authorized -
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, . . . or other
area, . . . where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours . . . and within
reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and
all pertinent conditions, structures, machines . . . equipment, and materials
therein, and to question privately any such employer ... or employee.
Id. § 657(a).
14 Id. § 658(a).
Is Id. § 666.
16 Id. § 655.
" OSHA schedules periodic inspections called Regional Programmed Inspections to en-
sure enforcement of the Act. The OSHA officers choose specific businesses for administrative
plan inspections on the basis of neutral criteria such as accident experience and the number of
employees in particular industries. [1976] OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL (CCH) ch. IV,
4327.2. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the Court held that OSHA must
obtain a warrant prior to conducting administrative plan inspections. The warrant would
insure that the proposed inspection "is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administra-
tive plan containing specific neutral criteria." Id. at 323.
18 The Act provides:
Any employees... who believe that a violation of a safety or health standard
exists ... may request an inspection by giving notice to the Secretary or his
authorized representative of such violation or danger .... If upon receipt of such
notification the Secretary determines there are reasonable grounds to believe that
such violation or danger exists, he shall make a special inspection in accordance
with the provisions of this section ... to determine if such violation or danger
exists.
29 U.S.C. § 657(f(1) (1976). To request an OSHA inspection, an employee must file a
complaint with the Area Director or a compliance officer. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.11 (1981). The
complaint must (1) be in writing, (2) allege that a violation exists at the workplace, (3) set forth
with reasonable particularity the grounds on which it is based, and (4) be signed by the
employee or the authorized employee representative. 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1) (1976).
OSHA has established a system of priorities for undertaking inspections and investiga-
tions. Of highest priority are allegations of imminently dangerous conditions which may cause
death or serious physical harm. Second are investigations resulting from fatalities or catastro-
phes (including one or more fatalities, or five or more employees hospitalized). Investigations
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B. Warrant Required: Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc."9
The Occupational Safety and Health Act does not require OSHA
to obtain a warrant in order to inspect. 20  In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
however, the Supreme Court held that if an employer objects to the
inspection, OSHA must obtain a warrant.2 1  The Court reasoned
that the fourth amendnent protects privacy in the workplace as well
as the home. 2
2
initiated by valid employee complaints of alleged violations or unsafe working conditions
receive third priority. Fourth are programmed inspections, scheduled by the Area Directors
yearly, based on various criteria designed to insure a neutral selection process with emphasis on
high-hazard industries. [1976] OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL (CCH) ch. IV, 4327.2.
19 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
20 Congress did not even consider the issue. Congressman Steiger, a cosponsor of the Act,
noted, however, that "in carrying out inspection duties ... the Secretary, of course, would
have to act in accordance with applicable constitutional protections." SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., 1I SESS., THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 1077 (Comm. Print 1971).
21 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1978). The president and general
manager of Barlow's, Inc., an electrical and plumbing installation business, sought to resist a
regional programmed investigation covered by an administrative plan, by refusing admission
to the OSHA inspector. The Barlow's Court did not regard such resistence as common, noting
that "the great majority of businessmen can be expected in normal course to consent to
inspection without a warrant." Id. at 316.
The Court's assertion was correct. In the three to four months immediately following the
Barlow's decision, OSHA attempted approximately 11,000 inspections, and fewer than 500
employers demanded warrants. [1978] 8 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 564.
Moreover, OSHA does not have to obtain warrants prior to all nonconsensual inspections. For
example, courts do not require warrants in emergency situations. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 509-10 (1978) ("[I]n the regulatory field, our cases have recognized the importance
of 'prompt inspections, even without a warrant, . . . in emergency situations."') (citations
omitted). In the context of OSHA inspections, the emergency exception includes imminent
dangers (see 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976), defining imminent danger as a condition "which could
reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or before the
imminence of such danger can be eliminated through the enforcement procedures otherwise
provided by this chapter") and accidents or fatalities where prompt inspection is necessary to
prevent a recurrence. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (dictum). See
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510 (1978); Rothstein, supra note 4, at 88-89.
Nonconsensual inspections of enterprises traditionally subject to federal regulation may
not require warrants. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (warrantless
search of licensed firearms dealer reasonable because of pervasive federal regulation of fire-
arms); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (because of a
historically strong federal control over liquor industry, Congress has the.power to authorize
warrantless searches of licensed liquor dealers and to make it an offense for liquor licensees to
refuse admission to a federal inspector).
' "The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well
as private homes. To hold otherwise would belie the origin of that Amendment, and the
American colonial experience." 436 U.S. at 311. In the past, courts had repeatedly invalidated
warrantless criminal investigative searches, regardless of whether they were directed at residen-
tial or commercial premises. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58
(1931) (warrantless search of business premises); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)
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C. Probable Cause for OSHA Inspection Warrants
Courts require a lesser showing of probable cause for the issuance
of OSHA inspection warrants than they do for criminal search war-
rants. 23 In criminal cases the government must establish probable
cause for "believing the occurrence of a crime and the secreting of
evidence in specific premises. "24 In determining whether probable
cause exists for administrative searches, courts use a balancing test
that weighs "the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails." 25  "Probable cause in the criminal sense is not required." 
2 6
(warrantless search of home); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)
(exclusionary rule applied to illegal search of business). See generally Note, supra note 4, 16 CAL.
W.L. REv. at 164. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967), the Court
extended fourth amendment protection to individuals subjected to administrative searches and
held that warrantless, nonconsensual administrative inspections of private residences violate
the Constitution. In a companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court
applied the fourth amendment to an administrative inspection of nonpublic portions of a
commercial enterprise:
The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commer-
cial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the
decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and
enforced by [an] inspector . . . without official authority evidenced by a warrant.
Id. at 543.
See note 26 infra.
24 United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971). See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 55-56 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963); Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925).
25 387 U.S. 523, 537. The "need to search" is, in part, justified by the public interest in
maintaining healthful and safe conditions in the community. Id. at 537. But see LaFave,
Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 S. CT. REV. 1,
14-15. Professor LaFave argues that the public interest in 100% enforcement of safety and
health ordinances is an insufficient justification for a diluted probable cause test because
enforcement of the criminal law is as compelling and yet the probable cause standard that law
enforcement officials must meet in criminal cases is stricter. "[W]e are committed to a
philosophy tolerating a certain level of undetected crime as preferable to an oppressive police
state. If there is a greater public interest in total enforcement of housing codes than of the
criminal law, the Camara opinion does not explain why." Id.
11 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978) (search pursuant to § 8(a) of the
Act). See Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 (7th Cir.
1980); Marshall v. W. & W. Steel Co., 604 F.2d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589
F.2d 1335, 1338-39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979) (warrant based on an employee
complaint under § 8(f) of the Act); Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 476 F. Supp. 698, 703
(M.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980). But see Note, supra note 4, 16 CAL. W.L.
REv. at 186: "If the [Barlow's] Court wanted to negate criminal probable cause requirements
for administrative searches it would have deleted ... ['may] be based on specific evidence of a
violation . . . .' Because it was included, it is evident that the court contemplated the two kinds
of probable cause in the administrative searches .... " Id. n.209.
A justification for a more lenient "administrative" probable cause standard is that
administrative inspections are less hostile intrusions that criminal searches; there is no probing
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No court has provided a definitive list of elements that support a
finding of administrative probable cause.2" OSHA generally can
meet the probable cause requirement in one of two ways, however. It
can show that it chose the specific business in question based on a
general administrative plan developed in reliance on neutral
sources. 2  Factors such as the inherent hazardousness of the opera-
into a person's private papers and effects, nothing is seized, and lesser penalties are imposed as
a result of the search. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967); LaFave, supra
note 25, at 18-19; Note, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 79, 83 (1979). In addition, a more stringent
probable cause requirement could do away with § 8(a) administrative programmed investiga-
tions based on neutral selection criteria if OSHA officers had to show evidence of a specific
violation. See generally J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AccUSED, PRETRIAL RIGHTS §
66 (1972 & Supp. 1979). One court intimated that a warrant based on an employee complaint
does not establish administrative probable cause. See In re Northwest Airlines, 587 F.2d 12,
14-15 (7th Cir. 1978) (OSHA affidavit of employee complaint is not specific evidence and does
not establish cause) (dictum).
27 See Marshall v. Trinity Indus., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1851, 1853 (W.D. Okla. 1979). Since
the Barlow's decision, courts have accepted various showings of probable cause. See, e.g., Pelton
Casteel, Inc. v. Marshall, 588 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1978) (issuance of inspection warrant for a
new plant based on showing that a silica violation had been the basis of a citation at the old
plant upheld); Marshall v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 574 F.2d 119, 123 (2d. Cir. 1978)
(issuance of a warrant based on employer's record of previous violations upheld). Courts have
also focused on the incidence of hazard in a given industry. See, e.g., In re Establishment
Inspection of Gilbert & Bennet Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335, 1341-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 884 (1979) (warrant based on a plan to reduce metal-working and foundry injuries and
illnesses met the administrative probable cause requirements); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Secre-
tary of Labor, 442 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va. 1977) (employer's inclusion on a hazardous
industry list a factor in establishing probable cause).
2 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978). These include statistics on
accident rates or OSHA violations in the industry, injury records at similar workplaces, the
nature of products or materials produced or handled, the number of employees and size of the
employer's business, the safety and health record of the employer, the length of time since the
last inspection, or the employer's history of OSHA violations. Rothstein, supra note 4, at
92-94. In Barlow's, the Court stated that probable cause pursuant to § 8 (a) of the Act (29
U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976)) could be satisfied if" 'reasonable legislative or administrative stand-
ards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establish-
ment].' " 436 U.S. at 320 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
Camara refers to an "area inspection." 387 U.S. at 538. The Barlow's Court, however, in
quoting from Camara omitted the word "area." This may indicate the Court's desire to narrow
the permissible scope of a reasonable inspection program.
Barlow's also changed the Camara formulation from "dwelling" to "establishment." This
broadens the protections afforded. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.2(b) (1981) defines "establishment" as a
single physical location where business is conducted or where services or industrial operations
are performed. "Dwelling" in Camara is any building that is a residence. See Note, supra note 4,
16 CAL. W.L. REV. at 177.
In addition, Barlow's proffered different criteria for the selection of a search target from
Camara's. In Camara, the Court listed several factors for choosing a target: the passage of time
between inspections; the nature of the building inspected; and the condition of the area where
the building is located. 387 U.S. 523, 538. The Barlow's Court pointed to other factors: the
"dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired
frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area." 436 U.S. at 321.
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tions carried on at the plant and the length of time that has expired
since the last inspection determine when the administrative plan in-
spection will take place.29 OSHA also can establish administrative
probable cause by using specific evidence of an employer violation. °
Such evidence usually is drawn from an employee complaint. 31
D. Scope of OSHA Inspection Warrants
Although the Act empowers OSHA to conduct nonconsensual
searches by obtaining a warrant, it leaves unclear the permissible
scope of such inspections authorized by warrant. Courts have inter-
preted the Act as specifically authorizing wall to wall searches in
programmed inspections.3 2  Courts differ, however, over the legiti-
mate scope of unprogrammed inspections under the Act.
The Act provides little guidance for determining the scope of
employee-triggered OSHA inspections.3" Nevertheless, the Consti-
tution imposes a limitation on these searches: they must be reason-
able. 34  In particular, the fourth amendment protects the employer
from unreasonable searches. 35  In deciding whether the scope of an
21 In applying for an administrative search warrant, the Secretary must show (1) that
regular established criteria exist for choosing the targets of its inspections, and (2) that those
criteria resulted in choosing that target. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21
(1978); W. RINGEL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 14.2 (2d ed. 1979).
One commentator stated that the Secretary's workplace inspection priorities alone would
not satisfy the requirement of a general administrative plan. See note 18 supra; Rothstein, supra
note 4, at 91 n.173.
30 436 U.S. at 320.
31 See note 18 supra; see, e.g., Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980);
Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313, 1320 (1980) (warrant
application including substance of employee complaints provided specific evidence of an
existing violation); Marshall v. Trinity Indus., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1851 (W.D. Okla. 1979); cf.
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1979).
2 See Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313, 1323 (7th Cir.
1980); Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 476 F. Supp. 698, 706 (M.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 626
F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980).
33 The statutory language provides little assistance. Courts are split over its interpretation.
See, e.g., notes 50 & 62 infra.
'4 "The ultimate requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that any proposed search or
inspection be reasonable." Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313,
1324 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
3- In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885), the Court stated that the purpose of the
fourth amendment was to protect "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life" from
invasion by the government. The Court considered the right of privacy the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security. Id. at 630. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the
Court pointed out that the fourth amendment was a reaction to the evils of the general warrant
used in England and, the writs of assitance in the colonies, and was
intended to protect against invasions of "the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life," . . . from searches under indiscriminate general authority. Pro-
tection of these interests was assured by prohibiting all "unreasonable" searches
1260
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OSHA inspection is reasonable, courts must balance the employer's
privacy interests against the statutory interest of providing employees
with safe workplaces.3 1
II
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF INSPECTIONS: THE SPLIT
Lower federal courts have attempted to balance these interests
but differ over the permissible scope of an OSHA inspection. Some
courts permit general, wall to wall inspections in response to employee
complaints. Others limit the inspection to the areas specified in the
complaint.
A. Wall to Wall Inspections
Burkart Randall Division of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall37 illustrates the
wall to wall approach. In Burkart, OSHA obtained a wall to wall
inspection warrant based on two employee complaints which alleged
violations in several isolated areas of the workplace. 8 The employer
argued that the sweeping scope of the search was unconstitutional
under the fourth amendment as well as unauthorized by the stat-
ute. 9 The Seventh Circuit dismissed these contentions and upheld
the warrant. 40
In assessing the reasonableness of the inspection, the court first
focused on the policies that support the inspection of worksites. The
court claimed that the "broad remedial purposes" of the Act, "de-
signed to ensure that employees are provided with safe workplaces,"
and seizures, and by requiring the use of warrants, which particularly describe
"the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized," thereby
interposing "a magistrate between the citizen and the police." . . .
Id. at 301. The amendment prohibits arbitrary governmental intrusions in every form; "If the
government intrudes on a person's property, the privacy interest suffers whether the govern-
ment's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or
regulatory standards." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978).
36 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
37 625 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1980).
38 The alleged violations included: hygiene hazards in the press department; leaking rest
room sewer gases coupled with poor ventilation; unsanitary eating areas; and inadequate fire
escapes near the production line. Id. at 1315. OSHA determined that there were reasonable
grounds to believe violations of the Act existed at that facility and sought a warrant to inspect
the premises to uncover these and other violations. A magistrate issued the warrant but
plaintiff Burkart obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting its enforcement. Id. at
1315.
39 Id. at 1315-16.
40 Id. at 1322.
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justified wall to wall inspection. 41  It was persuaded that when there is
probable cause to believe that parts of the workplace are not entirely
safe, the "purpose of the Act is best served . . . by inspecting the
entire facility." 42  The court noted, moreover, that it would be illogi-
cal to permit general searches for programmed inspections but not for
unprogrammed inspections. Said the court: "It would be anomalous
to . . . hold that only a limited inspection may be conducted where
there is particularized probable cause to believe that violations will be
found in the specific facility to be inspected." 43
The court then considered the employer's privacy interests in his
workplace. Because those interests were, according to the court,
''minimal,' 44 it saw little reason to limit the search's scope. The court
added that a warrant "issued by a neutral Magistrate after a showing
of probable cause, . . . adequately protected" against the possibility
of vexatious disruptions of the employer's operations.45 Thus, the
court declared that "it will generally be reasonable . . . to conduct an
OSHA inspection of the entire workplace." 46
Finally, the court dismissed the argument that the statute pro-
hibits a wall to wall inspection. The employer had argued that section
8(f)(1) of the Act-which authorizes OSHA to conduct "special
inspection[s] in accordance with the provisions of this
section . . . "47- prohibits general inspections in response to employee com-
plaints.1"48 But the court was convinced that under the Act "special"
does not mean "limited.' 49  Indeed, the court found that the section
41 Id. at 1324-25.
42 Id. at 1325. The court stated:
[R]estriction of the scope of the inspection would frustrate the purposes of OSHA.
If the compliance officers are not permitted to conduct thorough inspections, then
there would be a severe danger of employers being able to present a special
"sanitized" area to the official, while concealing real violations.
Id. (quoting In re Establishment Inspection of Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 5 OSHC (BNA)
2024, 2025 (N.D. Ill. 1977)). See also In re Establishment Inspection of Marsan Co., 7 OSHC
(BNA) 1557, 1559 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
43 625 F.2d at 1324.
44 Id. at 1325. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
41 Id. The Court stated:
The interposition of a neutral Magistrate between inspectors and employers guar-
antees that inspectors will not exercise unbridled discretion as to when and where to
inspect and provides assurances to employers that the inspection is authorized by
statute, is permissible under the Constitution, and will be conducted at a reason-
able time and in a reasonable manner.
Id. Id. at 1326.
47 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1) (1976). See note 18 supra.
48 625 F.2d at 1326 (emphasis added).
49 Id.
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expressly incorporated another of the Act's provisions, which specifi-
cally authorized general inspections.50 The court further pointed out
that the implementing regulations to section 8 provide that
"[i]nspections under this section shall not be limited to matters re-
ferred to in the [employee's] complaint." 5 l
B. Limited Inspections
A number of courts agree with the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Burkart.52  Nevertheless, there is a substantial opposing camp that
limits the scope of an OSHA inspection warrant to the subject matter
of the employee complaint on which it is founded. 53  Courts in this
camp limit the scope of the inspection by construing the Act narrowly
and, therefore, do not need to reach the constitutional issue of reason-
ableness.
Marshall v. Trinity Industries, Inc. 4 exemplifies the limited approach.
OSHA received two employee complaints alleging violations of the
Act in several areas of the employer's workplace. 55  Based on these
50 Id. The Burkart court noted that § 8(0(1) states that inspections are to be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of § 8 as a whole. The court interpreted this as incorporating §
8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2), which, according to the court, authorizes inspection of the
employer's entire workplace.
s1 625 F.2d at 1326. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.11(b) (1980).
52 See, e.g., In reEstablishment Inspection of Marsan Co., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1557 (N.D. Ind.
1979) (complaint alleging 13 violations, including inadequate ventilation, sufficient to autho-
rize a wall to wall hygiene inspection). In Marsan the court stated:
If OSHA was prevented from conducting comprehensive inspections, employers
could present special "sanitized" areas to them while concealing real violations. In
this situation the scope of the OSHA warrant must be as broad as the subject
matter regulated by the statute and restricted only by limitations imposed by
Congress and the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 1559. See also In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d
1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979) (probable cause based on employee complaint
and administrative plan); Dravo Corp. v. Marshall, 5 OSHO (BNA) 2057 (W.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1373 (3d Cir. 1978).
"3 See, e.g., Central Mine Equipment Co. 7 OSHC (BNA) 1185 (E.D. Mo.), vacated on other
grounds, 608 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1979) (ex-employee complaint of hazards created by welding
fumes and grinding dust at a drilling equipment manufacturing plant insufficient to authorize a
wall to wall inspection); Sarasota Concrete Co., [1979] OSHD (CCH) 23,839 (OSHRC),
aff'd [1981] OSHD (CCH) 25,360 (OSHRC) (employee complaint about concrete trucks not
broad enough to authorize overall inspection). See also Blocksom & Co. v. Marshall, 582 F.2d
1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1978) (warrant based on employee complaint and directing company to
produce for inspection "all records, files, [and] papers . . . bearing on" the safety of Block-
som's working environment may not be specific enough); Marshall v. Wollaston Alloys, Inc.,
479 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Mass. 1979) (OSHA inspection that included unauthorized private
employee interviews exceeded scope of the warrant).
r 7 OSHC (BNA) 1851 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
• The employee complaints alleged frozen toilets, faucets, and drinking fountains in cold
weather, forced climbing of pipes and conduit to repair frozen and ruptured pipes without
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complaints, OSHA obtained a wall to wall inspection warrant. The
employer refused entry to the compliance officers and challenged the
validity of the warrant authorizing broad inspection. 56 The Secretary
claimed that "[s]ince the violations described in the complaint [were]
probable cause to believe certain health and safety standards [were]
not being upheld, it [was] also reasonable to believe that other violations
besides those described [may have existed]." 57 Because of the likelihood of
these other violations, the Secretary argued that "the warrant must be
broad enough to encompass all possible areas of violations."5
The court rejected these arguments59 and, unlike the Burkart
court, construed section 8(f(1) of the Act narrowly. The court noted
that OSHA inspections under 8(f(1) are " 'special' inspection[s]" 60
triggered by an employee complaint. The statute's objective in autho-
rizing such inspections, the court postulated, is "to determine if such
[a] violation or danger exists." 1 The plain command of Congress, the
court concluded, is that
[tihe warrant must . . .be . . .limited to an inspection of those
specific areas of which the employee complained. This is all that is
necessary "to determine if such violation or danger exists." By its
words, the Act denominates this as a "special" inspection and it
should be so limited.62
III
STRIKING A BALANCE: A PROPOSED MIDDLE GROUND
Both approaches, the limited and the wall to wall, inadequately
define the allowable scope of an OSHA inspection warrant issued in
response to an employee complaint. Both are too mechanical. In
deciding whether the scope of the search is reasonable, the wall to wall
safety aids or ladders, crane loads lifted over employees, and tripping hazards caused by
welding leads and cables. Id. at 1853.
56 Id.
5 Id. at 1854 (emphasis in original).
" Id. (emphasis added).
59 Id.
60 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 657()(1) (1976)).
61 29 U.S.C. § 657(t)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
62 7 OSHC (BNA) at 1854. This court did exactly what the Burkart court refused to do-it
equated "special" with "limited." The district court held that general inspection warrants are
appropriate only in § 8(a) inspections where OSHA inspects the premises pursuant to an
administrative plan that relies on specific neutral criteria. Id.
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approach overemphasizes OSHA's statutory interest; in contrast, the
limited approach gives undue preference to the employer's privacy
interest. Both fail to reconcile adequately these competing interests.
Although the statute can be construed to authorize general
searches in section 8(f) inspections,63 the constitutional validity of the
Bukart wall to wall approach6 4 is questionable. A blanket warrant in
response to a limited and isolated complaint does not seem reasonable
because it unnecessarily compromises the employer's privacy. A war-
rant that authorizes a broad general inspection in response to any
employee complaint, regardless of the alleged violation's locality, un-
dermines the function of the warrant-insuring an inspection reasona-
bly related to the showing of probable cause.
On the other hand, the approach taken in Marshall v. Trinity
Industries, Inc.,65 which limits inspections to the specific area in the
complaint, is too restrictive. First, an alleged violation can affect areas
of the plant other than those specified in the complaint. In this
situation, it may be quite reasonable for the inspection to reach areas
beyond those named by the complaining employee. Second, the lim-
ited approach fails to recognize that sometimes the surrounding cir-
cumstances6 6 support a finding of administrative probable cause for
areas beyond those enumerated in the complaint. In such cases, the
limited inspection fails to protect adequately the important employee
and public interests in keeping the workplace safe.6 7
IV
PROPOSAL FOR DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF SECTION 8(f)
INSPECTION WARRANTS
The inadequacy of both the Burkart and Trinity formulas high-
lights the need for a better approach. In determining the reasonable-
ness of the inspection's scope, such an approach should protect ade-
quately the employer's privacy interests, as well as account for
OSHA's statutory interests. It should not mechanically authorize wall
to wall searches or limit them absolutely to the areas alleged in the
complaint. One better approach is this: Courts can require that the
scope of the warrant be reasonably related to the violations for which
63 See note 50 supra.
See notes 37-52 and accompanying text supra.
65 7 0SHC (BNA) 1851 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
6 See notes 72-76 and accompanying text infra.
"7 See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
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probable cause has been shown. 68  This would avoid the problems
that are inherent in both the Burkart and Trinity formulations. Such an
approach would guard against unreasonable and arbitrary outcomes,
which result from blanket wall to wall searches in certain circum-
stances. This will prevent OSHA from engaging in general "fishing
expeditions" as well. In addition, it will deny employees the chance to
harass employers by triggering a plant-wide search for an isolated
complaint. 69  This is far superior to the wall to wall approach be-
cause, in the final analysis, an impartial magistrate rather than an
involved OSHA inspector will determine the scope of the search.70
Moreover, this proposal is less restrictive than the limited Trinity
approach. Once the OSHA inspector makes a showing of probable
cause for the alleged violation, the scope of the warrant must only be
reasonably related to that violation. Therefore, the search will not
necessarily be limited to the specific area named in the complaint. 7 1
6' Although Barlow's indicated that probable cause in the criminal sense is not required,
436 U.S. at 320, an analogy to criminal search warrants can be drawn. In criminal cases
probable cause is required for each area searched. "There is no requirement that prevents a
single search warrant from issuing for more than one building or place as long as the various
places and things are specifically described and there exists adequate probable cause for search
of each place." State v. Ferrari, 80 N.M. 714, 718, 460 P.2d 244, 248 (1969). See Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (warrants must particularly describe the things to be
seized, thus making general searches impossible and leaving the officer executing the warrant
no discretion with regard to what is to be taken). In criminal searches, this particularity
requirement guards against general exploratory searches which violate the constitutional guar-
anty against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967);
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344 (1931); United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955) ("The basic require-
ment [of the fourth amendment] is that officers who are commanded to search be able from the
'particular' description of the search warrant to identify the specific place for which there is
probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed."); United States v. Pardo-Bolland,
229 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (a valid search warrant does not give searching officers
carte blanche to make a general exploratory search of the premises for items not specifically
related to the search warrant). The particularity requirement is related to the probable cause
requirement. If there is no specific description it will be apparent that there has not been a
sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items can be found at a particular place.
2 W. LAFAVE, SEaRCHES AND SEIZURES § 4.5, at 72 (1978). In the same way, requiring the
scope of an administrative warrant to be reasonably related to the probable cause shown
assures protection of fourth amendment rights and prevents general fishing expeditions by
denying the searching officer discretion.
69 See note 68 supra.
70 Another problem is inherent in the Bvrkart approach. Burkart can be read as forcing the
magistrate to choose between authorizing a broad, wall to wall search and no search at all. This
unreasonably restricts the issuing magistrate in his determination of the scope of the inspection.
He may be reluctant to allow a wall to wall inspection, which is disruptive to an employer,
when the probable cause is based on limited violations and few areas are involved. Because his
only alternative is to prevent any inspection, these violations will go uncorrected and will
continue to pose a danger to employees.
71 Of course, once the magistrate defines the scope of the warrant, the OSHA inspector
may not go beyond that. Cf People v. Gualandi, 21 Ill. App. 3d 992, 316 N.E.2d 195 (1974) (if
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Instead, the magistrate can make the scope of the search broad
enough to allow the OSHA inspector to determine the extent of the
violation in its entirety. If a violation exists in one part of the plant but
also could affect other parts, a more extensive search is reasonable and
therefore should be authorized.
In certain cases, the employee complaint will establish probable
cause for particular violations at the worksite. The magistrate, in
these cases, should limit the scope of the inspection to the areas
reasonably related to those violations. The magistrate may, however,
have other information in addition to the employee complaint. In
applying for the inspection warrant, the OSHA inspector might bring
certain surrounding circumstances to the attention of the magistrate.
The scope of the warrant should then bear a reasonable relationship to
the existing probable cause as evidenced by the complaint and the
surrounding circumstances. 72
There are a number of circumstances that militate in favor of a
broader warrant. One relevant factor that calls for an expanded search
is the number of complaints. 73  If the complaints are so numerous as
warrant specifies only part of a building, only that part can be searched) (criminal search);
Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 323 N.E.2d 319 (1975) (warrant authorizing search of
second floor apartment did not legitimate search of vacant third floor apartment) (same);
Riojas v. State, 530 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Crim. 1975) (where warrant named only house and cars
of defendant, search of shed on premises unlawful). See also People v. Rainey, 14 N.Y.2d 35,
248 N.Y.S.2d 33, 197 N.E.2d 527 (1964) (unless there is probable cause as to all the occupied
units in a building, a search warrant will be invalid if directed at all of a multi-occupancy
structure).
72 Of course, even under a warrant that authorizes less than a wall to wall inspection, an
OSHA inspector may note all violations in "plain view." The plain view doctrine holds that an
official who has a legal right to be in the location may obtain any evidence that is in "plain
view," even if beyond the scope of the warrant. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 4, at 70. Cf.
United States v. Various Gambling Devices, 478 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Golden, 413 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1969). "What is observable by the public is observable,
without a warrant, by the Government inspector as well." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 315 (1978) (footnote omitted). See also State v. Brothers, 12 Or. App. 435, 507 P.2d
398 (1973).
If sufficient numbers of violations surface, or if the OSHA compliance officer has reason to
believe that additional violations exist in other areas, he may return to the magistrate to request
a broader warrant. The Secretary in Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.
1980), argued that OSHA enforcement resources are better used if there is a wall to wall
inspection in the first instance, rather than two separate requests for warrants and two
inspections. The court responded by cautioning that "the Secretary may not exceed the
statutory limits imposed by Congress." Id. at 324. Another court put it this way: "[B]road and
indiscriminate inroads on fourth amendment safeguards, wrought in the name of administra-
tive expedience and weighty governmental interest, are [not] to be viewed with . . . favor."
Brennan v. Gibson's Prods., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 161 (E.D. Tex. 1976), vacated and remanded
with instructions to dismiss sub nom., Marshall v. Gibson's Prods., Inc., 584 F.2d 668 (5th Cir.
1978).
73 See Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 476 F. Supp. 698, 706-07 (M.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd,
626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980).
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to suggest pervasive violations, a wall to wall search may be reason-
able. The employer's past safety record and history of OSHA viola-
tions 74 are other relevant factors that the magistrate should consider.
The passage of time from the last inspection 75 might also be perti-
nent-if substantial time has passed since the last inspection, it may
be reasonable to assume that violations have arisen and gone uncor-
rected. The magistrate might also consider the type of industry in-
volved; the dangers present in a highly hazardous industry may make
a broader warrant more reasonable.76
The magistrate, therefore, should consider the employee com-
plaint in light of these surrounding circumstances. The scope of the
warrant issued should bear a reasonable relationship to the complaint
and surrounding circumstances. Although this approach is consistent
with the fourth amendment, it nevertheless gives the magistrate a
certain degree of flexibility.
Elements of such an approach are present in Marshall v. North
American Car Co. 77 In the spring of 1979, an employee complained to
OSHA of several violations in three areas of the North American Car
Company's seventy-acre Sayre, Pennsylvania, plant. The magistrate
issued a wall to wall warrant. 7' The district court quashed the war-
rant as overbroad7 9 and the Third Circuit affirmed. 80
In doing so, the district court and the court of appeals rejected
the wall to wall approach, 8' but they also recognized that in certain
74 See Marshall v. Berwick Forge & Fabricating Co., 474 F. Supp. 104 (M.D. Pa. 1979)
(permitting a general inspection in response to employee complaints but suggesting that, had
there been fewer alleged violatiofis and a less extensive record of past violations, it would have
limited the scope of the inspection). Id. at 113. See also Marshall v. Northwest Orient Airlines,
Inc., 574 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1978) (probable cause found for an OSHA inspection based
on employer's prior violations) (not section 8(0 search).
75 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967); Rothstein, supra note 4, at
94.
76 Allegations of violations in a high-hazard industry usually result in inspections of the
entire facility, whereas complaint inspections in low-hazard industries are usually limited to the
working conditions identified in the complaint. [1980] 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH [CCH]
4014, at 1319.
v 476 F. Supp. 698 (M.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 626 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1980).
78 The alleged violations were in the steamrack, an overhead criane that ran between some
of the buildings, and one of the paint shops. The warrant application simply recited the
employee complaint with no allegations of a history of past violations of the Act. The resulting
inspection included examination of safety records, the wood fabrication shop, a tool storage
area, the air brake shop, and the wiring and noise and air quality levels in some of these areas.
Although the inspectors did examine the paint shop, no inspection was made of either the crane
or the steamrack violations. 626 F.2d at 320. Obviously, the inspection exceeded the areas that
the complaint covered.
79 476 F. Supp. at 707.
80 626 F.2d 320.
"' See 476 F. Supp. at 706-07; 626 F.2d at 324.
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circumstances the scope of the warrant should go beyond the areas
specified in the complaint. The district court indicated that if the
magistrate had knowledge of certain surrounding circumstances a
broader warrant would be proper.82  Further, it expressly embraced a
balancing test similar to the one proffered in this Note:
[T]he Court must consider the scope of the warrant as compared to
the number and gravity of employee complaints and whether or not
it would be possible to limit the warrant so as to be no more
intrusive than necessary upon the employer's privacy while accom-
plishing the remedial purpose of the . . .Act.
3
The court of appeals embraced the proposition that the scope of the
search could go beyond the specific areas alleged in the complaint by
pointing out that "the scope of the inspection must bear an appropriate
relationship to the violations alleged in the complaint." 84
CONCLUSION
Courts currently do not have an adequate test to determine the
scope of employee triggered OSHA inspection warrants. Conse-
quently, they fail to balance properly employers' privacy interests and
the public's safety interests. The scope of these warrants should be
reasonably related to the violations alleged in the complaint and to
other relevant surrounding circumstances. Such an approach will lead
to safer workplaces without infringing upon employers' constitutional
protections. It will allow OSHA inspectors to carry out their duties
without unduly hindering employers. In this way it will reconcile the
interest in enforcing-the Act with the commands of the Constitution.
Barbara 1M. Maczynski
82 [The] complaint identified with specificity the areas of the . . . plant at which the
violations allegedly occurred. The application made no reference to the size of
the . . . plant nor to the geographic area covered by the operations . . . .Without
those crucial facts, the Magistrate could not have compared the extent of the intrusion
which was authorized by a general inspection warrant with the intrusion pursuant to a
warrant limited to the areas set forth in the employee complaint. Further, there is no
indication in the application for a warrant that. . . in the past. .. where violations
of the type alleged ...are found to exist it is probable that other occupational safety
and health violations exist in other parts of a facility.. ..
476 F. Supp. at 707.
83 476 F. Supp. at 706.
626 F.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
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